Serbia Kosovo Agreement Pdf

There are only two sure things about the agreement, both are very important and neither is set out somewhere in its text. The first is that the Serbian government has given up on keeping northern Kosovo in its system and has ceded its authority to Pristina. Second, Belgrade has implicitly recognized that Kosovo is a state. These are tectonic changes that will have an impact, no matter what happens to the first trials of implementation of the agreement. The over-emphasis on the details of the agreement is likely to be misleading; Many of its provisions are amended in practice and some may be forgotten over time. The very title of the agreement is misleading: supposedly on the “normalization of relations”, the first twelve points of the fifteen points of the agreement are rather on the management of the northern region of Kosovo controlled by the heir. There is only one point on which bilateral relations are explicitly discussed, and it is simply said that neither party will block the progress of the other side towards the EU. There is no point in holding elections without substantial support on the ground. If the North strongly opposes it, there is a risk of violence against the organizers, and polls that require strong protection from KFOR would be useless. Belgrade and Pristina must explain in detail what the agreement means for northern Kosovo.

You should take the time necessary to prepare the soil. The 19 April agreement between Kosovo and Serbia is an earthquake in Balkan politics: the ground has collapsed, familiar monuments have fallen, aftershocks continue to rage and new contours are slowly appearing. With or without amendment to the Serbian Constitution, it is not possible for northern Kosovo to repeat over and over again that it rejects the Belgrade-Pristina agreement, but that it is also a normal part of the Serbian legal and administrative system, because Belgrade entrusts it to the authority of Pristina. The North is thinking of three options. It can submit to integration into the Kosovo system and strive to expand the space of autonomy it offers them. It may declare its independence in order to negotiate a better agreement with one or both states that claim it. Or perhaps, on his own initiative, without formal explanations, undermine and obstruct the agreement where he can, and hope for a renegotiation. The Economic Normalization Agreements of Kosovo and Serbia are a couple of documents in which Kosovo and Serbia have agreed to facilitate economic normalization between them.

[1] The documents were signed on 4 September 2020 at the White House, in the presence of US President Donald Trump, by Kosovo Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti and Serbia President Aleksandar Vuéié. [2] Much of the agreement depends on the cooperation of the Serbs in northern Kosovo and their leaders, who all oppose the agreement and promise to resist. This community now has a bad reputation; they are portrayed as extremists, criminals or, at best, simply too few to allude to them. This picture is unfair: as those who spend time in the North know, its inhabitants are no different from their Balkan neighbours.